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I. INTRODUCTION 
How would you feel if a President could increase your taxes 
without congressional approval? What if the President could increase 
the price of essential goods, such as fresh foods and fuel, without 
Congress? Would such power be in accordance with the United States 
Constitution and its text? What if someone told you that the President 
does have such power: would you want to change it? 
The questions posed are not so much hypothetical possibilities, 
but rather, they are the current state of affairs in the United States. The 
changes to who may implement tariffs did not occur overnight, but 
instead, like many other matters in Washington, D.C., they took place 
over several decades. The Global Trade Accountability Act is a 
legislative proposal that is currently pending in the United States 
Congress, introduced by United States Representative Warren 
Davidson (R-OH-8)1 and United States Senator Mike Lee (R-UT),2 
that would change the answers to the questions posed above. The 
Global Trade Accountability Act would amend current law to subject 
unilateral executive tariff increases to congressional approval.3 
Currently, multiple statutes governing trade would be affected by this 
legislative proposal, such as the Trade Act of 1974, the Trade 
Expansion Act of 1962, and the International Economic Emergency 
Powers Act of 1977.4 The Global Trade Accountability Act would 
amend these laws, and others, to subject tariff increases to 
congressional approval. 
The Global Trade Accountability Act applies to unilateral 
actions to “suspen[d], withdraw[], or prevent[] the application of trade 
 
 1 Global Trade Accountability Act of 2019, H.R. 723, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 2 Global Trade Accountability Act of 2019, S. 1284, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 3 See Press Release, Mike Lee, U.S. Sen. Mike Lee (May 2, 2019), 
https://www.lee.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2019/5/sen-lee-reintroduces-global
-trade-accountability-act. 
 4 Id. 
2020 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 9:1 
260 
agreement concessions.” 5 Although, the Global Trade Accountability 
Act provides one exception to its general rule: a one-time, ninety-day 
exemption period of congressional approval of any unilateral tariff 
increase if the President declares that such tariffs are needed for “a 
national emergency, an imminent threat to health or safety, for the 
enforcement of criminal laws, or for national security.”6 But the 
President must provide Congress with “written notice” that she/he is 
implementing the ninety-day exception.7 Additionally, the Act would 
only apply to increases in tariffs, not the reduction of tariffs initiated 
by the President.8 Also, the Act would amend current free trade 
agreements minimally, such as the Dominican Republic-Central 
America-United States Free Trade Implementation Act (CAFATA-
DR) and the United States-Israel Free Trade Implementation Act of 
1985 (to name a couple), to simply make the trade agreements 
compliant with the Act’s provisions.9 
The Global Trade Accountability Act would allow Congress to 
begin the process of regaining its original Article I jurisdiction over 
trade that it delegated to the executive branch over the years.10 Article 
I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution states, among other 
things, “The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, 
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the 
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all 
Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United 
States,” and that Congress has the power “To regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations. . . .”11 
The President, by contrast, does not have explicit authority 
over trade in the Constitution.12 Instead, the President relies on 
 
 5 H.R. 723. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Lee, supra note 3. 
 9 H.R. 723. 
 10 See CAITLAIN DEVEREAUX LEWIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44707, 
PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY OVER TRADE: IMPOSING TARIFFS AND DUTIES (2016), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44707.pdf. 
 11 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 12 See U.S. CONST. art. II; IAN F. FERGUSSON & CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43491, TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY (TPA): 
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statutory delegation to exercise authority over trade.13 Although, for 
purposes of negotiating and making trade agreements, such as 
CAFATA-DR, the President has power to make treaties with the 
advice and consent of the Senate.14 In the precise words of Article II, 
Section 2 of the United States Constitution, “He [i.e., the President] 
shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to 
make treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur 
. . . .”15 Trade promotional authority, which is discussed below, has 
allowed for a simple majority vote when the President negotiates an 
agreement within the confines of the congressional trade authority and 
the trade promotional authority is current.16 
Regarding a related matter, Congress’s delegation of powers to 
the executive branch has been litigated in the federal courts over the 
years.17 Congressional delegation is a topic of great controversy, and 
with that, much scholarship and opinion has been written on the issue 
of congressional delegation.18 Included in delegation-related opinions 
is a recent United States Supreme Court dissenting opinion authored 
by Justice Gorsuch that could very well evolve into a majority opinion 
in the near future.19 However, the question of general congressional 
delegation of legislative powers is a subject beyond the scope of this 
comment. 
Instead, this paper presents the following. The first section 
below will go over some of the history of trade legislation subject to 
amendment by the Global Trade Accountability Act, from the Trading 
with the Enemy Act of 1917 to Smoot-Hawley to the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977. The following section will 
 
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 2 (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
R43491.pdf (“[T]he Constitution assigns no specific responsibility for trade to the 
President.”). 
 13 See Lee, supra note 3. 
 14 See FERGUSSON & DAVIS, supra note 12. 
 15 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
 16 See FERGUSSON & DAVIS, supra note 12. 
 17 See J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928); Gundy v. 
United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019). 
 18 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES 341-45 (5th ed. 2015). 
 19 Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2131-148 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
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review the applicability of the Global Trade Accountability Act today. 
The economic effects of the Global Trade Accountability Act, the 
views on tariffs by members of Congress, how the Act will apply 
regardless of who is President, and the potential downsides of the Act 
will all be discussed. Finally, the conclusion will be last and will serve 
as a wrap-up. 
II. HISTORY 
This section highlights the history of enacted trade legislation 
that would be affected by the Global Trade Accountability Act. As to 
the applicability of the Global Trade Accountability Act, this section 
will start in 1917, with the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917. But 
first, a brief discussion on the first tariff bill passed by the United States 
Congress in 1789.20 
A. The Tariff Act of 1789 
The first tariff bill passed by Congress was the Tariff Act of 
1789.21 The bill provided a means for the government to obtain 
revenue.22 The Tariff Act of 1789 placed a five percent tariff on 
imported goods.23 The Tariff Act of 1789 is included here to show how 
Congress has been involved in trade policy since the beginning of the 
Republic and that the debate over trade is by no means a new 
phenomenon.  
B. Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 
In 1917, Congress delegated some of its power to the 
executive; the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 provided that 
“‘[d]uring the time of war or during any other period of national 
emergency declared by the President, the President may” restrict trade 
 
 20  John M. Dobson, Two Centuries of Tariffs: The Background and Emergence of 
the U.S. International Trade Commission, UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
COMMISSION, 6 (Dec. 1976), https://www.usitc.gov/publications/other/pub0000
.pdf.    
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
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between the United States and foreign nations.24 It is important to 
understand the historical backdrop of enacted statutes that delegated 
Congress’s trade authority. For instance, in 1917, the first World War 
was ongoing. Congress may have wanted to allow the President to act 
fast and react to national security concerns. Congress continued its 
theme in delegating its power to the President to set the nation’s tariff 
rates with the next bill of consideration. 
C. Tariff Act of 1930; Smoot-Hawley 
In 1930, Congress enacted the Tariff Act of 1930,25 better 
known as “Smoot-Hawley“ (named after Senator Reed Smoot and 
Congressman Willis Hawley).26 Smoot-Hawley is a widely known tariff 
bill that arguably made the Great Depression worse.27 The Tariff Act 
of 1930 allowed the President, by proclamation, to issue duties28 on 
those countries found to be discriminating against the United States in 
its commercial activities.29 For purposes of the Global Trade 
Accountability Act, the section at issue in Smoot-Hawley is Section 
338, which deals with discrimination by foreign countries.30 Section 
338 would be amended by the Global Trade Accountability Act to 
allow for congressional approval of the President’s determination that 
a country has discriminated against the United States.31 Not a lot is 
known about the extent and authority behind Section 338, as 
 
 24 Trading With The Enemy Act of 1917, ch. 106, § 3, 40 Stat 411, https://
tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/uscode/uscode1940-00705/uscode1940-
007050a002/uscode1940-007050a002.pdf. 
 25  Kimberly Amadeo, What the Smoot Hawley Act Can Teach Protectionists Today, 
THE BALANCE (updated Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.thebalance.com/smoot-
hawley-tariff-lessons-today-4136667. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Louis Jacobson, Is protectionism a big part of the Great Depression, as Ben Sasse 
said?, POLITIFACT (May 31, 2018), https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/
statements/2018/may/31/ben-sasse/protectionism-big-part-great-depression-ben-
sasse-/. 
 28 Definition of ‘Customs Duty’, THE ECONOMIC TIMES, (2020), https://
economictimes.indiatimes.com/definition/customs-duty (last visited Jan. 15, 2020) 
(a duty “is a tax imposed on imports and exports of goods”). 
 29 LEWIS, supra note 10; 19 U.S.C.A § 1338 (West 2020). 
 30 See Lee, supra note 3. 
 31 Id. 
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Presidents have rarely invoked it.32 Nonetheless, Smoot-Hawley would 
be effectively amended and consistent with the Global Trade 
Accountability Act, which would no longer allow the President to 
unilaterally raise tariffs without congressional approval. 
D. Reciprocal Trade Agreement of 1934 
In 1934, Congress passed the Reciprocal Trade Agreement of 
1934. With this legislation, Congress delegated more of its Article I 
power to regulate trade to the President. In this case, President 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt (“FDR”) was the beneficiary of Congress 
delegating its powers.33 Given Congress passed this statute in 1934, 
during the Great Depression, the law intended to alleviate some of the 
pressures felt by the agriculture community.34 
Not all representatives in Congress favored the bill. Some 
members of Congress foresaw the abrogation of Congress’s trade 
authority.35 One of these members was the Ranking Member of the 
House Committee on Ways and Means, Allen Treadway (R-MA).36 
Congressman Treadway stated that the bill “would surrender the 
taxing power of Congress to the President and his subordinates in 
violation of both the letter and spirit of the Constitution.”37 
Congressman Treadway’s argument against the bill then seems to 
resemble similar arguments today about trade abrogation. Both 
congressional delegation and the surrendering of Congress’s taxing 
power are arguments that are used in favor of passing the Global Trade 
Accountability Act. 
 
 32 Danny Vinik, Trump’s six hidden trade weapons, POLITICO (Feb. 28, 2017, 
3:34 PM), https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2017/02/how-trump-could-
overhaul-trade-without-quitting-the-wto-000329. 
 33 See The Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1934, UNITED STATES HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, 
https://history.house.gov/Historical-Highlights/1901-1950/The-Reciprocal-
Trade-Agreement-Act-of-1934/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2020). 
 34 See The Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1934, supra note 33. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
2020 The Global Trade Accountability Act 9:1 
265 
E. Trade Expansion Act of 1962 
In 1962, Congress passed the Trade Expansion Act of 1962,38 
which allows the President to implement actions “to adjust the imports 
of [an] article” so that the article of importation no longer poses a 
national security threat to the United States.39 Section 232 is the 
governing section of the Trade Expansion Act that allows for this.40 
Section 232 has recently produced a lot of news as the Trump 
Administration has invoked it to implement tariffs against a wide range 
of imported articles, including steel and aluminum imports from 
foreign countries.41 Section 232 provides the President with broad 
discretion, with little oversight, as the President may levy these tariffs 
as he “deems necessary.”42 There is no requirement that the President 
receive congressional approval.43 
1. Trade Expansion Act of 1962: Applicability to Today 
Many have disputed whether President Trump’s 
implementation of national security tariffs were actually based on 
national security reasons.44 In a memorandum to Secretary of 
Commerce Wilbur Ross, former Defense Secretary James Mattis stated 
that “U.S. military requirements for steel and aluminum each represent 
only about 3 [percent] of U.S. production. Therefore, [the Department 
of Defense] does not believe that the findings in the reports impact the 
ability of [the Department of Defense] programs to acquire the steel 
 
 38 LEWIS, supra note 10. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 What You Need to Know About Implementing Steel and Aluminum Tariffs on 
Canada, Mexico, and the European Union, THE WHITE HOUSE (May 31, 2018), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/need-know-implementing-steel-aluminum-
tariffs-canada-mexico-european-union/. 
 42 LEWIS, supra note 10. 
 43 John Brinkley, Trump’s National Security Tariffs Have Nothing To Do With 
National Security, FORBES (Mar. 12, 2018, 11:41 AM), https://www.forbes.com
/sites/johnbrinkley/2018/03/12/trumps-national-security-tariffs-have-nothing-to-
do-with-national-security/#78d65856706c. 
 44 Id. 
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or aluminum necessary to meet national defense requirements.”45 This 
memorandum begs the question: Given that the Department of 
Defense only needs three percent of U.S. steel and aluminum 
production, is there a real national security concern? 
Additionally, as an article in The Hill points out, President 
Trump implemented these tariffs against the United States’ allies, 
including Canada, Mexico, and European Union countries.46 Canada, 
Mexico, and many of the European Union countries are part of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO):47 people may find it hard 
to believe that these tariffs were truly implemented for national 
security reasons. The implementation of these tariffs is a policy 
question that should be made by the people’s representatives in 
Congress and the President, instead of the President alone. 
These examples show the impact a unilateral executive action 
can have on a wide array of affairs, both domestic and foreign. An 
important question to consider is whether Americans would like their 
President to solely hold this power, unchecked by an elected 
representative body? Additionally, the Constitutional framers granted 
Congress authority over trade, and there has been no constitutional 
amendment to change such authority.48 Rather, Congress’s trade 
authority has been statutorily delegated. 
F. Trade Act of 1974 
In 1974, Congress passed the Trade Act of 1974.49 The Global 
Trade Accountability Act would apply to the Trade Act of 1974.50 
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 grants the President authority to 
assure that trade agreements are properly carried out and to “resolve 
 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 See EU member countries in brief, EUROPEAN UNION (Oct. 10, 2019), 
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries/member-countries_en; 
What Is NATO?, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (2020), https://
www.nato.int/nato-welcome/index.html#basic. 
 48 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8. 
 49 See LEWIS, supra note 10. 
 50 Lee, supra note 3; H.R. 723. 
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trade disputes, and open foreign markets to U.S. goods and services.”51 
The Trade Act of 1974 is the main statute that grants presidential 
power to enact “trade sanctions on foreign countries that either violate 
trade agreements or engage in other unfair trade practices.”52 If 
discussions “to remove the offending trade practice fail, the United 
States may take action to raise import duties on the foreign country’s 
products as a means to rebalance lost concessions.”53 The goods to be 
taxed are placed on a “retaliation list,” and then the tariffs are applied.54 
The Trade Act of 1974 also allowed for the fast-track of trade 
agreements.55 
G. International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 
In 1977, Congress passed the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act, which allows the President to declare a national 
emergency and block or modify imports.56 The Global Trade 
Accountability Act would subject the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act of 1977 to modification. The International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 allows a President “to 
impose economic-based sanctions.”57 The International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act of 1977 was first used following the 1979 
Iranian hostage crisis.58 When implementing the act, the President is to 
confer with Congress.59 But Congress has never revoked the 
President’s authority under the Act as of March 2019.60 Concurrent 
resolutions are insufficient to overturn presidential actions; therefore, 
 
 51 Section 301, INT’L TRADE ADMIN. (Jul 25, 2018) https://www.trade.gov/
mas/ian/tradedisputes-enforcement/tg_ian_002100.asp. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 What is the History of Fast Track?, CLINTON WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, 
https://clintonwhitehouse2.archives.gov/Initiatives/FastTrack/history.html (last 
visited Aug. 24, 2020). 
 56 LEWIS, supra note 10. 
 57 CHRISTOPHER A. CASEY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE 
INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY ECONOMIC POWERS ACT: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, 
AND USE (2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R45618.pdf. 
 58 Id. 
 59 LEWIS, supra note 10. 
 60 CASEY ET AL., supra note 57. 
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Congress needs a two-thirds majority to overturn an action taken by 
the President (if the President vetoes).61  
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 
was recently called into question when President Trump said he could 
use it to direct firms to quit their business relations with China.62 This 
proposed idea shows the extent to which the Global Trade 
Accountability Act would have an impact on the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977, as the President would 
need congressional support to implement new or additional tariffs. 
III. THE GLOBAL TRADE ACCOUNTABILITY ACT AND TRADE TODAY 
Today, trade has become a hotly debated issue. Whether one 
thinks the United States should have trade proliferation (or not) is a 
policy question that will not be addressed here. The question this paper 
seeks to address and discuss is how the Global Trade Accountability 
Act would change the current statutory law, congressional power over 
trade, and foreign trade. One can see that the Global Trade 
Accountability Act would give Congress more authority over trade—
not to the extent as originally set out in the Constitution, but more 
than Congress currently possesses. Enacting the Global Trade 
Accountability Act would be an important first step in making 
Congress more accountable to “We the People.” The legislation would 
be a step in the right direction in restoring Congress’s constitutional 
authority in regulating commerce with other countries, imposing taxes 
on “We the People,” and restoring Congress’s Article I powers as a 
whole.63 
The United States participates in trading relationships with 
many countries. Previously, NAFTA governed trade between the 
United States, Canada, and Mexico, but recently, President Trump 
replaced NAFTA with the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement 
 
 61 See Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (The 
Supreme Court invalidated the legislative veto); See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
 62 Peter Baker & Keith Bradsher, Trump Asserts He Can Force U.S. Companies 
to Leave China, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08
/24/world/europe/trump-g7-summit.html. 
 63 U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
2020 The Global Trade Accountability Act 9:1 
269 
(USMCA). Here, much of the focus will be to discuss the relevance of 
the Global Trade Accountability Act as it generally relates to Canada 
and Mexico. The reasoning behind doing so is that Mexico and Canada 
are currently significant trading partners of the United States, and with 
the USMCA’s passage, the countries will surely continue to be 
significant trading partners.  
A. Economic Effects of the Global Trade Accountability Act 
In 2018, President Trump enacted tariffs on Canada and 
Mexico, among other countries, using Section 232 tariffs (national 
security tariffs) on steel and aluminum imports.64 The United States 
imports about 16 percent of its steel and about 56 percent of its 
aluminum from Canada.65 The effect of implementing these tariffs has 
been a net negative for the United States in Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) calculations.66 According to the Tax Foundation, when 
considering the effects of President Trump’s tariffs as a whole, 
(calculations are against all countries and all products), per April 2018, 
they have reduced the United States’ GDP by 62.5 billion dollars, or 
0.25 percent, and lowered wages by 0.16 percent.67 Although, the 
United States has brought in an additional 86.13 billion dollars in tariff 
revenue.68 These numbers reflect the negatives (reduced GDP and a 
cost on consumers to some extent) and the positives (additional 
revenue)–opinions may vary as to how much consumers pay and how 
much producers pay the tariff.  
In regards to Canada, the steel and aluminum tariffs imposed 
by the Trump Administration resulted in taxing 12.8 billion dollars of 
goods.69 Then, Canada retaliated with its own set of tariffs after the 
 
 64 See White House, supra note 41. 
 65 Thomas Franck, Canada, Brazil — but not China — will be hit hardest by 
Trump’s steel tariffs, CNBC (updated Mar. 5, 2018, 4:43 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/
2018/03/01/canada-brazil--but-not-china--will-be-hit-hardest-by-trumps-steel-
tariffs.html. 
 66 See Erica York, Tracking the Economic Impact of U.S. Tariffs and Retaliatory 
Actions, TAX FOUND. (updated Sept. 18, 2020), https://taxfoundation.org/tariffs-
trump-trade-war/. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
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Trump Administration implemented tariffs against them.70 When 
countries implement tariffs against others, those countries often 
respond by imposing retaliatory tariffs. Hence, many characterize such 
disputes as “trade wars” as the countries go back and forth, 
implementing more and more tariffs.71 When countries implement 
tariffs back and forth, any benefits of free trade begin to disappear.72 
According to the Tax Foundation: 
Economists generally agree that free trade increases the 
level of economic output and income, and conversely, 
that trade barriers reduce economic output and 
income. Historical evidence shows that tariffs raise 
prices and reduce available quantities of goods and 
services for U.S. businesses and consumers, which 
results in lower income, reduced employment, and 
lower economic output.73 
The Global Trade Accountability Act could have subjected the tariffs 
against Canada to congressional approval, which could have very well 
stopped their implementation, as many GOP Senators also opposed 
or expressed dissatisfaction with these tariffs.74 The note about the 
GOP senators is made as Republican senators are needed to make a 
majority in the Senate. Of course, the President could have used the 
90-day exception rule provided in the Global Trade Accountability 
Act, but the exception would have only been good for 90 days.75 
Although this is much speculation as some tariffs on China may have 
been approved. Senators have expressed differing views depending on 
which countries the tariffs were implemented against, such as Canada 
 
 70 Id. 
 71 See James Chen, Trade War, INVESTOPEDIA (updated Nov. 2, 2020) 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/trade-war.asp. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 See Press Release, U.S.Sen. Ben Sasse, Statement on Trade War (May 31, 
2018), https://www.sasse.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2018/5/sasse-statement-
on-trade-war. 
 75 See H.R. 723. 
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and Mexico, compared to China.76 People may view China more 
harshly, and many would say rightfully so, given their history and 
actions relating to trade, such as intellectual property theft.77 Given 
China’s bad reputation as a trade partner, and the Trump 
Administration’s tariffs against them in an attempt to bring them to 
the table to negotiate, many may want the United States to cooperate 
with other countries to apply additional pressure on China. For 
instance, the United States could work with its European allies, Japan, 
South Korea, and others to pressure China by getting allies to help 
crackdown on China’s behavior. 
If Congress had halted these other tariffs, the other countries 
may not have implemented their own retaliatory tariffs. Thus, the 
Global Trade Accountability Act would have likely affected the United 
States’s trade policy and other countries’s trade policies. This scenario 
shows the true potential impact of the Global Trade Accountability 
Act on international trade policy. 
Over the years, Mexico and Canada’s trade partnership has 
resulted in the yearly exchange of billions of dollars of goods and 
services.78 Going back to the national security tariffs, the question 
should be asked: Should one person jeopardize what millions of 
consumers and producers have depended on, that is, transactions and 
 
 76 Burgess Everett, Republicans gobsmacked by Trump’s tariffs, POLITICO 
(Updated May 31, 2018, 5:36 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018
/05/31/trump-tariffs-canada-mexico-republican-response-615479. 
 77 See Michael Collins, It is Time to Stand Up to China, INDUSTRYWEEK (June 
13, 2016), https://www.industryweek.com/trade/it-time-stand-china (the article 
highlights currency manipulation, state owned enterprises, and technology transfers, 
among other ways that China distorts the trading system); Louis Jacobson, Newt 
Gingrich says China stole $360 billion in intellectual property from U.S., POLITIFACT (May 
17, 2016), https://www.politifact.com/punditfact/statements/2016/may/17/newt-
gingrich/newt-gingrich-says-china-stole-360-billion-intelle/ (Former Speaker of the 
United States House of Representatives, Newt Gingrich, stating, “When you hear, 
for example, that the Chinese last year [2015] probably stole $360 billion in 
intellectual property from the United States, I think being tough about that’s a good 
thing,”[] and “I think conservatives can be for very tough-minded trade.”). 
 78 See U.S.-Canada Trade Facts, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE 
(2020), https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/americas/canada (visited Aug. 24, 2020); 
See U.S.-Mexico Trade Facts, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (2020), 
https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/americas/mexico (visited Aug. 24, 2020). 
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business relationships with other countries, without a check by 
Congress? 
Later, the Trump Administration proposed tariffs against 
Mexico due to illegal immigration concerns.79 President Trump 
proposed a 5 percent tariff, with the possibility of progressing as high 
as 25 percent.80 The impact of these tariffs would have been quite 
substantial, given the United States and Mexico’s trade relationship.81 
The United States, in 2018, imported roughly 347 billion dollars of 
goods alone (not taking into account services here).82 It is possible that 
Mexico could have also retaliated if the Trump Administration would 
have went ahead and implemented these tariffs, which would have 
probably hurt the United States’s exports. 
The Trump Administration claimed authority to impose tariffs 
against Mexico because of the illegal immigration crisis on the United 
States’s southern border.83 Specifically, the Trump Administration 
claimed it was an emergency under the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act of 1977.84 This national security determination 
would have likely been challenged in court,85 which is beyond the scope 
of this paper; but if Congress were to pass the Global Trade 
Accountability Act, then Congress would have had to approve of the 
President’s proposed tariffs.86 The President could have used the 90-
day exception, which would then trigger other actions,87 but it would 
still only be a 90-day exemption. 
To put an across the board five percent tax into context, 
consider the following. In 2018, the United States imported 93 billion 
 
 79 Paul Davidson, How tariffs on Mexican imports could affect what you pay for 
vegetables and cars, USA TODAY (updated June 24, 2019, 4:38 PM), https://
www.usatoday.com/story/money/2019/05/31/tariffs-trump-mexico-import-
tariffs-could-hurt-consumers/1299579001/. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 U.S.-Canada Trade Facts, supra note 78. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Lee, supra note 3. 
 87 See H.R. 723. 
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dollars of goods in vehicles and 16 billion dollars in mineral fuels.88 
Additionally, Mexico is the United States’s largest source of agricultural 
imports, at 26 billion dollars.89 Included in this category are fresh 
vegetables and fruit, both at almost 6 billion dollars each; wine and 
beer, over 3.5 billion dollars; and other types of foods at around 4 
billion dollars.90 
There are many questions that come to mind upon considering 
these numbers and the goods that would be subject to a potential tariff. 
First, how do these goods translate into a national security threat? 
Additionally, one has to ask, does one really want to pay 5 percent 
more for essential goods, such as fruits and vegetables? Now, one may 
think that a 5 percent tax on fruit is a minimal price in exchange for 
more border security and a way to combat illegal immigration. That 
may be true as a policy matter, depending on one’s views, and such 
determination is beyond the scope of this paper. The question here is 
whether such a determination should be voted on by the People’s 
representatives? 
Additionally, think of the impact on consumers if all vehicle 
imports faced a 5 percent tariff. If the United States imported a whole 
car at a price of say 20,000 dollars, the consumer would pay an 
additional 1,000 dollars; this amount seems to be more than pocket 
change and may start to change one’s opinion on the matter. But, as 
stated before, many may believe that such a cost is worth the security, 
but should one person be able to have such an impact on consumers 
without congressional approval? If one does believe that the cost is 
justified, the individual’s elected representative may vote in favor of 
the tariff. Their representative votes on other major bills, such as 
immigration measures or tax laws, so they could do the same here. 
As for economic effects, yes, the tariff will benefit some 
American producers, but a net loss remains due to the effects on 
consumer surplus—consumers will seek substitutes to replace these 
 
 88 U.S.-Canada Trade Facts, supra note 78. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
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goods we import too.91 There are many possible repercussions of 
applying such tariffs, but that is beyond the scope of this paper. On a 
more legal note of major concerns, deviating from the Constitution’s 
text and structure should be a major concern to people. 
B. Views on Tariffs in the Congress 
If the Global Trade Accountability Act was enacted, one must 
wonder whether these proposed tariffs would be approved if President 
Trump tried to enact them. Per the many news reports, would enough 
Republican senators vote in favor of these tariffs to receive majority 
approval? 92 In a PBS article, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell 
(R-KY) stated, “There is not much support in my conference for 
tariffs, that’s for sure.”93 In the same article, Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) 
gave his take on the Republican Conference’s view of the once 
proposed tariffs against Mexico. The article states: 
“Deep concern and resistance,” is how Sen. Ted Cruz 
of Texas characterized the mood. “I will yield to 
nobody in passion and seriousness and commitment to 
securing the border, but there’s no reason for Texas 
farmers and ranchers and manufacturers and small 
businesses to pay the price of massive new taxes.”94 
These Republican senators represent half of Congress, and the tariff 
proposals would have to pass the Senate under the Global Trade 
Accountability Act. The tariffs would also need approved in the House 
of Representatives.95 If one had to guess, Senator Cruz might be 
suggesting that there are better ways to secure the southern border. To 
name a few alternative measures, Congress could appropriate money 
to hire more border agents, improve and add more technology to the 
 
 91 Colin Danby, Basic Analysis of a Tariff, UNIV. OF WASH. (1998), 
https://faculty.washington.edu/danby/bls324/trade/tariff.html. 
 92 Lisa Mascaro et al., GOP senators line up against Trump’s Mexico tariff plan, 
PBS (June 5, 2019, 7:44 AM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/gop-
senators-line-up-against-trumps-mexico-tariff-plan. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 H.R. 723. 
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border, or what President Trump ran on: build a wall; or maybe 
Congress could authorize and appropriate money for all the ideas 
mentioned. Nonetheless, all these ideas represent alternatives to 
implementing tariffs against Mexico (no judgment is issued on any of 
the proposals here). These are policy decisions that must be made by 
the people’s representatives in Congress. 
C. Global Trade Accountability Act’s Non-Political/Applicability to 
All Presidents 
Much analysis and examples of the Trump Administration’s 
tariff enactments and proposals have been made here for two reasons: 
these examples are recent, and the administration’s actions have caused 
much debate amongst scholars, the public, members of Congress, and 
the media. This analysis is done because the Trump Administration is 
using these statutes and measures, and President Trump is the current 
executive in office. The Global Trade Accountability Act would apply 
regardless of who is President and their party affiliation. To remove 
any speculation of the Act’s partisan bias, it is worth noting that 
Congressman Davidson and Senator Lee, the Act’s sponsors, are both 
Republicans and amongst the most conservative members of their 
respective bodies and parties, per Heritage Action.96 “The Heritage 
Action Scorecard is the leading conservative scorecard. It allows 
constituents to hold their members accountable based on how they 
vote on specific key pieces of conservative legislation.”97  
If President Obama, a Democrat, was still in office, the Global 
Trade Accountability Act would have applied to him also. In providing 
additional examples of the Global Trade Accountability Act’s potential 
impact and to show how it would apply regardless of the President or 
 
 96 Rep. Warren Davidson, HERITAGE ACTION FOR AMERICA (2020), 
https://heritageaction.com/scorecard/members/D000626/116; Sen. Mike Lee, 
HERITAGE ACTION FOR AMERICA (2020), https://heritageaction.com/scorecard
/members/L000577/116. 
 97 About, HERITAGE ACTION FOR AMERICA (2020), https://
heritageaction.com/about (The scorecard is essentially a percentage score of how 
representatives vote per the votes that the organization identifies and takes a position 
on. Members of Congress may be rated from 0 to 100.) 
2020 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 9:1 
276 
party in office, below is a brief discussion of examples of how the Act 
would have applied many decades ago. 
In the 1960s, when President Lyndon Johnson (LBJ) was in 
office,98 a “chicken war” began between the United States and 
Europe.99 In 1962, Europe increased “tariffs on imported chicken, 
effectively shutting U.S. producers out of a growing and lucrative 
poultry market.”100 The two sides were unable to resolve the issue using 
other means, and therefore, in 1963, “the United States retaliated by 
boosting tariffs on four products important to European exporters: 
potato starch, dextrin, brandy, and light trucks.”101 The tariff was set at 
25 percent and went into “effect in January of 1964.”102 So why did 
President Johnson impose tariffs on trucks when Europe targeted 
agriculture? Well, the answer may be that the President wanted to 
satisfy a constituency group, that being the labor union bosses.103 
“Lyndon Johnson wanted support from the United Auto Workers 
union . . . and he wanted to avoid a strike before the 1964 election. 
UAW chief Walter Reuther wanted the President to stifle import of 
Volkswagen trucks into the U.S. They high-fived and the rest is 
history.”104 
With these considerations in mind, one would question 
whether the President should have such unilateral executive power 
over trade. If you agree with President Johnson’s position, ask yourself: 
what if a President were to target goods that you find are needed in 
this country, but the next President needs a political win that you may 
 
 98 Lyndon B. Johnson Biography, BIOGRAPHY.COM (Updated Aug. 14, 2019), 
https://www.biography.com/us-president/lyndon-b-johnson (Johnson served as 
President from November 1963 to January 1969). 
 99 Daniel J. Ikenson, Ending the “Chicken War”: The Case for Abolishing the 25 
Percent Truck Tariff, CATO INST. (June 18, 2003), 
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6806 [https://web.archive.org/
web/20110921113753/http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6806]. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Marco den Ouden, Chicken Tax Makes Trucks Expensive and Unavailable, 
FOUND. FOR ECON. EDUC. (Jan. 16, 2017), https://fee.org/articles/chicken-tax-
makes-trucks-expensive-and-unavailable/. 
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not agree with? What if you believe that the United States should be 
using more solar panels to meet its energy demands, and a coal 
association convinces a President they need protection, would you feel 
the same? Or, to the contrary, what if a President wants to ban imports 
of materials that are used for fracking and coal production to satisfy 
their constituents that want to ban fracking and coal? How would this 
make one feel if it meant that they would lose their job or pay more 
for electricity? 
Keeping today’s issues in mind is crucial because one may 
agree with President Trump’s actions in these scenarios, but that does 
not mean that the next administration’s trade policies will be the same; 
thus, Congress should pass the Global Trade Accountability Act and 
restore their Article I powers. Suppose a presidential candidate such as 
Elizabeth Warren was elected and unilaterally implemented a 100 
percent tariff on imports of natural gas, coal, or products that help 
produce those resources for national security reasons. Would one like 
to have the Act in place to allow congressional oversight? To further 
illustrate, consider if one were in the natural resource business and 
used an import to help furnish the production of goods. Use the 
example of metal pipe for oil pipelines or heavy operational 
equipment. How would one feel about a significant increase in 
production costs because one person, to satisfy a political promise, 
implements a tariff for supposedly national security reasons? My guess 
is that person would not be content, as their business would be 
dramatically hurt. The product subject to the tariff may not necessarily 
be a true national security concern derived from the import itself. 
Rather, the tariff is a vehicle to hurt an activity that the executive 
disapproves of doing. And who would say the limit would be 100 
percent tariff, as maybe the tariff would be 200 percent? The point is 
that a President Warren, or whomever, could come up with whatever 
they wanted. 
Another area that may catch the hearts of many would be gun 
parts. How would one feel if a President Warren (or another 
presidential candidate) decided that any imports of gun parts is a 
national security threat, and those imports would be subject to a certain 
percentage tariff? Now, a President Warren would likely use other 
means, such as issuing a national emergency, due to the ways around 
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such restrictions on imports such as domestic suppliers increasing 
production of their goods, but imposing tariffs on these goods would 
still most likely increase their price. 
It should not matter which political party possesses the 
presidency for the Global Trade Accountability Act to be deemed 
good or bad legislation. One may think that as long as their President 
of choice is in office, then checks and balances are not as important. 
But what about when the political winds change and the opposing 
party takes over? Would one feel the same way? One could ask this 
about an array of things in American life, such as regulatory affairs, but 
the Global Trade Accountability Act would at least adjust the checks 
and balances for trade. 
Over the last several years, we have seen what a change in 
administrations has done when one President comes in, and with the 
stroke of a pen, creates a regulation. Then the next President comes 
into office and reverses previous actions. For example, outside of 
trade, look no further than to the Paris Climate Accords, and on the 
domestic front, the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and 
Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA) program. Both were unilateral 
executive actions taken by President Obama that President Trump 
rescinded upon taking office. The constitutionality of some executive 
orders, policy aside, such as DAPA has caused much debate, but it is 
an issue outside the scope of this paper.105 
Although, if President Obama would have followed the 
Constitution and made his case to Congress to pass immigration 
reform, then President Trump would have been unable to rescind his 
actions so easily. President Trump would have needed Congress to 
pass a law, and then he would have had to sign the law to repeal the 
enacted legislation. But instead, President Obama took matters into his 
own hands and went around the Constitution’s legislative process. 
Another example is the Affordable Care Act, or Obamacare. President 
Trump may tweak the Affordable Care Act via an executive order, but 
a lot of the Affordable Care Act remains on the books because 
 
 105 United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (equally divided Court upheld 
lower court’s ruling granting injunction to the DAPA program). 
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Congress has not completely repealed it (as the ACA was passed via 
the legislative process).106 The same rationale would apply to tariff 
implementation. 
The point above is to expand upon the need for Congress to 
reassert its authority over trade as a whole. The Global Trade 
Accountability Act is at least a good first step in this process of 
Congress reasserting its Article I powers, and Congress should reassert 
its powers in other areas also. 
One may ask, what if there is a real emergency where the 
President must swiftly implement tariffs to protect the United States’ 
interests? The Global Trade Accountability Act takes into 
consideration such national security concerns with its one-time 90-day 
exception to the general rule. It is then up to the President to make 
his/her case before Congress to have them approve such measure.107 I 
have noted what several senators have said in regards to the recent 
trade concerns, but the next statement highlights the differences 
between imposing tariffs on different countries (as previously alluded 
to above). Following an announcement on the removal of tariffs on 
goods from Mexico and Canada, Senator Ben Sasse (R-NE) issued the 
following statement: 
China is our adversary; Canada and Mexico are our 
friends. The President is right to increase pressure on 
China for their espionage, their theft of intellectual 
property, and their hostility toward the rule of law. The 
President is also right to be de-escalating tension with 
our North American allies. Today’s news that the 
Administration is dropping steel tariffs on Canada and 
 
 106 The constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act was decided in 2012 by 
the Supreme Court in NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). Although many question 
whether the Supreme Court rendered the correct decision, see MIKE LEE, WHY JOHN 
ROBERTS WAS WRONG ABOUT HEALTHCARE: A CONSERVATIVE CRITIQUE OF THE 
SUPREME COURT’S OBAMACARE RULING (2013), as it stands, the key provision of 
the individual mandate was upheld in the Affordable Care Act. See Sebelius, 567 U.S. 
519 (2012). 
 107 H.R. 723. 
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Mexico is great for America, great for our allies, and 
certainly great for Nebraska’s agriculture industry.108 
Again, this statement highlights the varying perceptions by members 
of Congress and the American people on the implementation and 
reduction of tariffs. 
As Senator Sasse indicates, people may feel quite differently 
about implementing tariffs against China compared to Mexico or 
Canada. These sentiments on tariffs mean that some tariffs would have 
a broader consensus and would receive an affirmative vote in Congress 
and would go into effect; other tariffs do not have such consensus, and 
they would not go into effect. However, as previously mentioned, it 
would be up to the President to make his case to Congress. 
D. Possible Negatives of the Global Trade Accountability Act 
One may ask, what are the downsides of the Global Trade 
Accountability Act? To start, if Congress passed the Act, it would be 
better than the current situation where Congress has little say on how 
tariffs are implemented. As previously stated, the Global Trade 
Accountability Act would give Congress a vote. With that being said, 
one may argue that it still does not restore Congressional approval to 
all votes on trade. To provide that remedy, Congress could still 
implement additional legislation or amend the Act, which would allow 
a congressional vote to decrease tariffs. If the President opposes 
raising or decreasing tariffs, then he could invoke his veto power; 
however, like other matters, Congress could override the President’s 
veto with a two-thirds vote. But, yes, the complete congressional 
authority would not be restored with the current version of the Global 
Trade Accountability Act. 
Another possible negative is the way the Act is set up; it could 
leave itself open to constitutional challenges. In a way, the Act codifies 
the legislative veto (mentioned above). If someone argues that the Act 
 
 108 See Press Release, U.S. Sen. Ben Sasse, Statement on Distinction Between 
Chinese Cold War and North American Trade Tensions (May 17, 2019), 
https://www.sasse.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2019/5/sasse-statement-on-
distinction-between-chinese-cold-war-and-north-american-trade-tensions. 
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violates the Presentment Clause,109 then the Act could be fixed by 
allowing Congress to completely legislate on tariffs by introducing 
them, and the President can sign them into law. In essence, Congress 
could simply amend the Act to regain its original constitutional 
authority over trade.110 This would be the best version of the Act: 
Congress proposes tariff rates, votes, and the President vetoes or signs 
the bill into law. 
Over time, the consequences of deviating from the original 
constitutional framework (separation of powers) have come to the 
forefront, and the need to restore Congress’s power over trade, and 
other areas such as regulatory affairs, are much needed.111 Although 
some may argue that the President may need to take swift action to 
protect the United States’s interests, the Global Trade Accountability 
Act addresses such national security concerns with its one-time, 90-
day exception.112 Therefore, the Act has potential national security 
concerns covered. In the end, the Global Trade Accountability Act is 
a step in the right direction for trade policy in its attempt at restoring 
Congress’s constitutional authority over trade, as laid out in Article I, 
Section 8 of the Constitution.113  
Also, the Global Trade Accountability Act would allow for a 
majority vote on the tariffs (a simple majority vote may be a good or 
 
 109 See U.S. CONST. art. I, §7. 
 110 See Bill Funk, Why the REINS Act Is Unconstitutional, THE CENTRE FOR 
PROGRESSIVE REFORM BLOG, http://progressivereform.org/cpr-blog/why-the-
reins-act-is-unconstitutional/ (mentions how INS v. Chada applies to a bill with a 
similar procedural mechanism, the REINS Act, that deals with the regulatory state, 
and argues that the bill unconstitutional; my goal here is to highlight possible 
criticisms of the Global Trade Accountability Act.). 
 111 The consequences of deviating from federalism has also come to the 
forefront in other areas. 
 112 See H.R. 723. 
 113 See U.S. CONST. art. I, §8 ; see also Press Release, U.S. Sen. Mike Lee, Make 
Trade Accountable Again (Jun 14, 2019), https://www.lee.senate.gov/public
/index.cfm/the-chairman-s-note?ID=F40A5593-F673-43A1-8E1A-084CDE356
2C6 (provides background regarding the Global Trade Accountability Act and 
asserts that, during the “progressive era,” Congress began delegating its powers, 
including power of levying tariffs, to the President; Senator Lee states that “what 
legislative powers Congress has given the executive branch, Congress can also take 
back”). 
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bad idea, depending on how one feels about the Senate filibuster).114 
But currently, trade agreements are usually subject to simple majority 
votes also, per fast-track legislation, or Trade Promotional Authority 
(TPA).115 
E. Fast-Track Legislation/Trade Promotional Authority (TPA) 
Expanding on what TPA is exactly and how it came about is 
important in understanding trade relations with other countries and 
trade policy debates between the President and Congress. TPA is a 
“fast-track” mechanism that allows trade agreements negotiated by the 
executive branch to be considered before Congress and approved by 
an up or down vote, which is a majority vote.116 The trade agreement 
is proposed, with no floor amendments allowed.117 Therefore, the 
Senate filibuster would not come into play (the same filibuster 
mentioned previously in footnote 127). 
Per the Congressional Research Service, here is how TPA 
works: 
Under TPA, an implementing bill may be eligible for 
expedited consideration if (1) the trade agreement was 
negotiated during the limited time period for which 
TPA is in effect; (2) the agreement advances a series of 
U.S. trade negotiating objectives specified in the TPA 
 
 114 For more information about what a “filibuster” is, see VALERIE 
HEITSHUSEN & RICHARD S. BETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30360, FILIBUSTERS 
AND CLOTURE IN THE SENATE (2017), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product
/pdf/RL/RL30360. To see a video discussing the filibuster more, see Mike Lee, 
Filibusters: History, Purpose, & Controversy [POLICYbrief], FED. SOC’Y. (Jan. 17, 2019), 
https://fedsoc.org/commentary/videos/filibusters-history-purpose-controversy-
policybrief (the video is presented by Senator Mike Lee, who introduced the Global 
Trade Accountability Act in the United States Senate). Understanding the filibuster 
is essential to understanding the significance of receiving an up or down vote. Many 
bills remain bills and do not become laws in the Senate due to the filibuster. The 
filibuster may be viewed as a good or bad tool, depending on how one feels about a 
particular piece of legislation or the role of the United States Senate being a super-
majoritarian deliberative body. I will not delve into that debate here. 
 115 FERGUSSON & DAVIS, supra note 12. 
 116 Id. 
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statute; (3) the negotiations were conducted in 
compliance with an extensive array of notification and 
consultation with Congress and other stakeholders; 
and (4) the President submits to Congress a draft 
implementing bill, which must meet specific content 
requirements, and a range of required supporting 
information. If, in any given case, Congress judges that 
these requirements have not been met, TPA provides 
mechanisms through which the eligibility of the 
implementing bill for expedited consideration may be 
withdrawn in one or both chambers. TPA is authorized 
through July 1, 2021. The United States has 
renegotiated the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), now known as the United 
States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) for 
which TPA could be used to consider implementing 
legislation.118 
TPA was “reauthorize[d]” in 2015 per the “Bipartisan Congressional 
Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015 (TPA-2015), [which] 
was signed into law by former President Obama on June 29, 2015 (P.L. 
114-26).”119 
Why talk about TPA? Because TPA is one of those pieces of 
legislation that can get lost in the acronym heavy world of Washington, 
and TPA is critical to understanding trade policy. TPA, when 
authorized and in effect, gives the President guidance for congressional 
approval. But, at the same time, TPA allows Presidents to negotiate 
trade agreements and receive up or down votes from Congress.120 In 
some respects, as to congressional approval with an up or down vote 
and congressional oversight, TPA and the Global Trade Accountability 
Act are similar. One must not overlook the significance of allowing for 
straight up or down votes in the United States Senate. Trade 
agreements subject to the Senate Filibuster would likely need a 
minimum of 60 votes (treaties with other countries need the Senate’s 
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advice and consent by two-thirds vote).121 Two-thirds of the current 
amount of United States senators would be 67 senators. The need for 
67 senators almost anytime would require several senators from the 
opposing party to vote for approval. This means it would be more 
difficult to pass the agreement, compared to the need of a simple 
majority of senators, which may be all from the President’s party if that 
party is in control of the United States Senate.122 
To show the magnitude of what a simple up or down vote can 
do, consider the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act previously discussed. When 
Smoot-Hawley was considered, there were 1,253 amendments voted 
on when the bill was on the House floor.123 Imagine Congress 
subjecting a trade agreement that President Trump’s Administration 
negotiated, such as USMCA, to over 1,000 amendments. The trade 
agreement could end up being vastly different than what was originally 
negotiated. The agreement would likely need to go to conference and 
be reconciled into a uniform bill, and then be passed by both chambers 
of Congress.124 
If the President uses TPA, then Congress would vote on the 
agreement without any amendments, and the agreement would only be 
subject to an up or down vote.125 TPA makes it easier for the President 
to negotiate and enact trade agreements with foreign countries. 
Although, keep in mind that Congress still has a say with TPA, as a 
 
 121 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § II. 
 122 Party Division, UNITED STATES SENATE (2020), https://www.senate.gov
/history/partydiv.htm (provides a history of the makeup of the United States Senate 
by party division). In the 116th Congress, there are 53 Republicans. Id. 
 123 Michael Barone, Tariffs: Where Does the President Get His Power? 
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congressional chamber could refuse to bring the trade agreement to 
the floor for a vote or simply vote down the proposed agreement. 
One may think that trade effects are small, but when 
considering the reciprocal impact and the effect on iterations and 
cooperation with other countries, especially the United States’s allies, 
does trade policy really have a minimal impact? Additionally, actions 
on trade affect everyday life. One should want a more accountable 
government, and holding the representatives closest to the People 
responsible for the nation’s policies is a good first step. Suppose one 
does not like how their elected official voted. In that case, that person 
may vote against them, express their concerns to the representative, 
donate money to an opposing candidate in an upcoming election, or 
even run against them or campaign against them. In essence, “We the 
People” will have more say on local representatives than we do the 
President of the United States.126 
As the Federalist Papers127 state: “The House of 
Representatives will derive its powers from the people of 
America. . . .The executive power will be derived from a very 
compound source. The immediate election of the President is to be 
made by the States in their political characters.”128 The Congress “will 
derive its powers from the People of America.”129 (The Federalist 
Papers were written before the adoption of the 17th Amendment, 
which resulted in the Senate being elected by direct election, rather 
than by the State legislatures).130 It is Congress who “derive[s] its 
 
 126 U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 127 Ken Brexler & Robert Brammer, The Federalist Papers: Primary Documents 
in American History, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (updated Aug 13, 2019), https://
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 128 THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 414 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
2003). 
 129 Id. 
 130 See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. 
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powers from the People of America.”131 Americans that disagree with 
their elected officials’ decisions are likely to contact their representative 
more easily than the President of the United States. Additionally, 
members of Congress have smaller constituencies than the President. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the Global Trade Accountability Act would 
amend several statutes to make them compliant by subjecting unilateral 
executive tariff increases to congressional approval. Congressional 
approval of the tariffs would allow for congressional oversight over 
the matter, and in doing so, the Global Trade Accountability Act 
provides a step towards Congress regaining its original Article I power 
over trade.132 The Global Trade Accountability Act would have 
widespread effect, including, potentially, a foreign country’s retaliatory 
tariffs against the United States, which affects their trade policy. 
If Congress were to vote on the Global Trade Accountability 
Act and pass it, the United States’ foreign relations and its trade policy 
would be greatly affected, especially given the size and reach of the 
American economy. Although the Global Trade Accountability Act 
does not subject all tariff activity to a congressional vote for approval, 
it does subject unilateral tariff increases to such approval. In this sense, 
the Act, in its current form, does not reinstate Congress’s original 
congressional powers and authority over trade that the Constitution 
grants in Article I, Section 8. But if Congress were to adopt the Act, 
some of its original Article I power over trade would be regained (one 
can hope Congress regains all of its Article I power though). 
From existing free trade agreements, such as the United States-
Israel Free Trade Implementation Act of 1985,133 to statutes such as 
the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (which includes Section 232 
National Security Tariffs),134 the Global Trade Accountability Act 
would amend the mentioned legislation in some form or another, with 
 
 131 THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 128. 
 132 See U.S. CONST. art. I § 8. 
 133 H.R. 723. 
 134 LEWIS, supra note 10. 
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the former being minimally and the latter being more significantly.135 
Legislation such as the Trade Expansion Act and its wide 
congressional delegation of power is what the Global Trade 
Accountability Act seeks to amend most significantly. 
With the Act still pending in Congress’s respective committees, 
the House Ways and Means Committee136 and the Senate Finance 
Committee,137 it is time for the committees to vote on the Global Trade 
Accountability Act. The American people should know how their 
elected members of Congress feel about accountability to the people 
they have a privilege to represent.138 It is also time for Congress to 
regain its Article I powers and for the Constitution’s text and structure 
to be restored in all areas, including trade. 
 
 
 135 H.R. 723. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Global Trade Accountability Act of 2019, S. 1284, 116th Cong. (2019) 
 138 Hon. Michael Lee: Article I Reform and the Global Trade Accountability Act 
[Restoring Article I], YOUTUBE (Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=mkuZZHcfxwc (Senator Lee discussing restoring Article I power and his 
Global Trade Accountability Act). 
